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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the European Union - Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (the 
Khartoum Process), which is primarily aimed at combating human trafficking and smuggling in 
the region. It probes this partnership model in the field of external migration control from a 
human rights and refugee law perspective. Instead of being based on a human rights approach, 
the Khartoum Process has relied on a managerial, project-based approach to the complex realities 
of mixed migration in the Horn of Africa. The article uses Sudan as a case study, due to its 
critical role in the Khartoum Process. It identifies systemic weaknesses in Sudan‟s law and 
practice, which cast serious doubts on Sudan‟s ability to combat trafficking and smuggling in 
conformity with international standards, and its reliability as a partner in “migration 
management”. It also shows how the Khartoum Process risks undermining the coherence of the 
European Union‟s external policy, particularly in respect of human rights protection in the 
region. These findings corroborate critiques of, and accentuate concerns about flawed 
partnership models and externalisation policies driven by imperatives of migration control. The 
article concludes by sketching out an alternative approach based on attention to context, process 
and respect for human rights. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Union (EU), as part of its external relations, has responded to migration and 
refugee movements from its neighbouring continents by pursuing a number of bilateral (e.g. 
Libya, Turkey) and multilateral (e.g. the Rabat process on Western migration routes) initiatives 
designed to reduce the number of those reaching its borders. In November 2014, the EU-Horn of 
Africa (HoA) Migration Route Initiative, also referred to as the Khartoum Process, was added to 
the growing number of “migration management partnerships”. It is a political process at 
ministerial level that brings together the EU, its member States, the African Union (AU) 
Commission and States from the region.
1
 The Khartoum Process is a response to the large 
number of migrants and refugees
2
 from the HoA.
3
 Persons seeking to leave their countries and 
the region increasingly have to rely on smuggling and many of them have been subjected to 
trafficking.
4
 These developments have resulted in estimated tens of thousands of trafficking 
victims since 2009,
5
 most of whom are Eritreans.
6
 Sudan serves as “the centre for the transit of 
victims from the Horn to Europe through Libya or Egypt and the Mediterranean sea.”7  This 
situation provides the context for the primary focus of the Khartoum Process, namely “to prevent 
                                                     
1
 Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan as countries from the HoA, and Egypt, Tunisia 
and Libya due to their role as transit countries. 
2
 The article refers to refugees as those who qualify under art. 1 of the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, 1951, 189 UNTS 150, 28. Jul. 1951 (entry into force: 22 Apr. 1954), the Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees, 606 UNTS 267 (entry into force: 4 Oct 1967) and the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa, 1001 UNTS 45 (entry into force 20 Jun 1974).  
3
 Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Eritrea are among the ten major source countries of refugees worldwide 
UNHCR, Global Trends 2015, 2016, 16. 89% of Eritreans, 68% of Somali and 47% of Sudanese asylum-seekers 
were given status (refugee, subsidiary protection, humanitarian reasons) in EU member States. See A. Bitoulas, 
“Population and social conditions”, Eurostat, Data in focus, 3/2015, 13.   
4
 Sahan/Igad, Human Trafficking and Smuggling on the Horn of Africa-Central Mediterranean Route, Feb. 2016, 6-
7, available at: www.eritreanrefugees.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/IGAD-Sahan-2015-Trafficking-Report.pdf 
(last visited 5 Oct. 2016); SIHA, Letters from Eritrea: Refugee women tell their story, Kampala, 2013. 
5
 UNHCR, Smuggling and Trafficking from the East and Horn of Africa, Progress Report, 2015, 2. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Life & Peace Institute, Human Trafficking and Smuggling in the Horn of Africa: Patterns, Dynamics, and Criminal 
Networks, Oct. 2015, 3, available at: http://life-peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Human-Trafficking-and-
Smuggling-in-the-Horn-of-Africa.pdf (last visited 5 Oct. 2016), 6; Sahan/Igad, Human Trafficking and Smuggling, 
9, 10.  
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and tackle the challenges of human trafficking and smuggling of migrants,”8 which foregrounds 
the illegality of movement and adopts a criminal law approach with the goal of “better 
managing” migration.  
The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, in his report on large movements of 
refugees and migrants, referred to the Khartoum Process as one of the regional initiatives
9
 that 
“can underpin collective efforts to build mechanisms for improved future responses.”10 He 
considered “creating a „deal‟ in which responsibilities were shared among countries of origin, 
transit and destination and involved both humanitarian responses and development solutions” to 
be a key success factor.
11
 The subsequent UN General Assembly‟s New York Declaration for 
Refugee and Migrants “took note” of the Khartoum Process as a regional initiative.12 This 
positive vision of regional initiatives forms part of a broader development, in which regional 
partnerships have been identified as important components of international migration 
governance.
13
 The turn to regional initiatives as a policy instrument of migration control has 
attracted critical scrutiny.  In the literature on migrant and security studies, regional initiatives 
have been viewed as a manifestation of the externalisation and outsourcing of migration control, 
in response to the failure of unilateral repressive measures.
14
 The “proliferation of informal, 
process-oriented, experimental forms of transgovernmental governance, promoted by countries 
of destination in their relations with countries of origin and transit” is not the purported panacea 
built on equal partnerships.
15
 Instead, it is marked by power asymmetry and conditionality, with 
the partnership discourse “reflect[ing] the continuing predominance of destination countries‟ 
                                                     
8
 Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of the Khartoum Process (EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route 
Initiative), Rome, 28 Nov. 2014, 4 (emphasis added). The terminology used does not acknowledge that many 
“migrants” from the region are known to be refugees. 
9
 UN Secretary-General, In Safety and dignity: addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, UN Doc. 
A/70/59, 21 Apr. 2016, para. 44. 
10
 Ibid., para. 41. 
11
 Ibid., para. 42. 
12
 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, UN Doc. A/71/L.1, 13 September 2016, para. 19. 
13
 See in particular the International Agenda for Migration Management (2004). See on global migration 
governance, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, UN Doc. A/68/283, 7 Aug. 2013, 
paras. 8-26. 
14
 See S. Lavenex and R. Stucky, “„Partnering‟ for migration in EU external relations”, in R. Kunz, S. Lavenex and 
M. Panizzon (eds.), Multilayered Migration Governance: the promise of partnership, London, Routledge, 2011, 
116-142; and, further, J. Huysmans and V. Squire, “Migration and Security”, in M. D. Cavelty and  T. Balzacq 
(eds.), Routledge Handbook of Security Studies, 2nd ed., London, Routledge, 2017, 161-171. 
15
 R. Kunz and S. Lavenex, Partnerships in international migration governance: the missing link?, SNIS Working 
Paper, (undated), available at www.snis.ch/system/files/2008_-_ndeg250_-_migration_partnerships.pdf, (last visited 
15 Jun. 2017), 1, 2-13. 
4 
 
concerns with immigration control rather than mobility, rights or development.”16 This critique is 
echoed in the legal literature, in which bilateral and regional partnerships have been identified as 
measures designed to achieve migration control objectives while escaping legal constraints that 
international law imposes on States once individuals, particularly refugees, reach their 
jurisdiction.
17
 External anti-trafficking measures form part of this development, whereby 
ostensible humanitarian imperatives mask migration control objectives.
18
 These concerns are 
reflected in the work of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, who warned 
that regional consultative processes “can lead to a dilution of normative standards and a lack of 
accountability, monitoring and oversight, thus potentially negatively affecting the human rights 
of migrants.”19 
The Khartoum Process is the latest example of such regional initiatives. Its focus on the 
HoA has raised widespread concern over the appropriateness of using the partnership model in 
the context of one of the most volatile regions in the world, marred by repressive regimes, armed 
conflicts, transnational crime, dire socio-economic conditions and forced displacement. This 
article builds on the critical literature on externalisation of migration governance and policy 
analysis of regional initiatives. Its aim is to probe the Khartoum Process from a refugee rights 
and human rights perspective, with a view to evaluating whether it provides a suitable model for 
migration partnerships in the context of the HoA. It examines whether the claim that the 
“promotion and respect of human rights constitute a cross-cutting issue of our cooperation”20 is 
borne out in the conception and implementation of the Khartoum Process, focusing on the 
following core questions: Is the process of the Khartoum Process informed by a human rights 
framework? Are the partners in the HoA capable of implementing the envisaged projects in 
conformity with applicable human rights and refugee rights standards? Does this partnership 
model compromise the ability and willingness of the EU and its member States to pursue a 
robust policy vis-à-vis countries such as Sudan on the protection of human rights?  Sudan is used 
as a primary case study in the HoA to consider the rights implications of the Khartoum Process.  
                                                     
16
 Ibid., 2. 
17
 J. Hathaway and T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, “Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence”, Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law, 53, 2015, 235-284. 
18
 M. Lee, “Human Trafficking and Border Control in the Global South”, in K. F. Aas and M. Bosworth (eds.), The 
Borders of Punishment, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, 128-145. 
19
 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Aug. 2013, para. 73. 
20
 “Rome Declaration”, 3. 
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The situation in, and the role of Sudan is critical as it is a country of origin, transit and 
destination of mixed migration movements. It is also a State whose conduct has been at the 
forefront of regional and international human rights and humanitarian concerns, including over 
the alleged commission of international crimes. Against this background, Sudan has most readily 
embraced the Khartoum Process as a means of garnering political and financial capital and of 
ending its international isolation.  
Based on an assessment of the initial phase of the Khartoum Process, in terms of its rationale, 
policy process and substantive focus, we argue that it serves to corroborate criticism of 
externalisation and regional initiatives as a form of governance that adversely affect the human 
rights of migrants and refugee rights. Instead of paying heightened attention, called for by the 
particular geographic context, to ensuring respect for human rights in the design, process and 
implementation of the initiative, the Khartoum Process replicates problematic partnership 
models. As such, it fails to provide a suitable model to address the multiple challenges faced by 
people and States in the HoA, and for EU action on questions of migration in, and from the 
region. Uncritical references in UN documents to the initiative as an example of international 
cooperation are misplaced, and should not inform policy making in this area, as they fail to 
contribute to develop a rights-based approach to international migration governance. Considering 
the apparent shortcomings of the Khartoum Process, we sketch out the parameters of an 
alternative approach that anchors any initiatives aimed at tackling the interrelated challenges of 
human rights violations, armed conflict and forced migration in the region in a rights-based 
framework. 
 
2. THE KHARTOUM PROCESS AND THE EU’S AND AU’S POLICY 
INITIATIVES ON MIGRATION  
 
The Khartoum Process forms part of the EU‟s external action in Africa, in which security and 
control paradigms have come to dominate in the field of migration.
21
 It is situated at the interface 
of regional, primarily AU and EU, initiatives on migration, which have gathered pace over the 
                                                     
21
 See further, Kunz and Lavenex, Partnerships in international migration governance. 
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last decade, particularly since 2014.
22
 The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) 
is the “overarching framework of EU external migration policy”.23 GAMM rests on four pillars, 
namely “legal migration and mobility, [preventing and reducing] irregular migration and 
trafficking in human beings, international protection and asylum policy, and maximising the 
development impact of migration and mobility.”24 It is to be implemented through dialogues 
“both by regional processes and at bilateral/national level with key partner countries.”25 These 
“[d]ialogues will build on regular political steering, through high-level and senior official 
meetings, action plans, cooperation instruments and monitoring mechanisms, where relevant.”26 
GAMM explicitly mentions the Rabat Process
27
 and refers to “a possible additional sub-regional 
framework in the Horn of Africa/East Africa (to be further explored).”28  
In April 2014, the EU and AU committed themselves “to further dialogue and deepening of 
our cooperation in the field of migration and mobility within the framework of the Joint Africa-
EU Strategy.”29 To this end, they agreed on an Action Plan for 2014-2017, which focuses, inter 
alia, on strengthening efforts to combat trafficking in human beings and the fight against 
irregular migration.
30
 When Italy assumed the Council of the EU Presidency in July 2014, it set 
out the “external dimension of migration” as one of its key priorities:  
We need to combine the necessary prevention of illegal migration – including through 
more effective border control policies – and the fight against smuggling and human 
                                                     
22
 For AU initiatives, see The Migration Policy Framework for Africa (AU), EX.CL/276 (IX), Jun. 2006; African 
Common Position on  Migration and Development, EX.CL/277 (IX), 2006; Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat 
Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children, 2006, AU document EX.CL/313 (X), Annex IV, 
2007; Revised AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention, (2007-2012) CMDCCP/EXP/3(III), 2007; 
AU.Commit Campaign: When the fight against trafficking becomes a priority for Africa, 2010, available at: 
www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/newsroom/all-news/launch-aucommit-campaign-against-human-trafficking-horn-
and-east-africa (last visited 5 Oct. 2016). See also IGAD Regional Migration Policy Framework, 45th Ordinary 
Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers, 2012. 
23
 COM(2011) 743, 18 Nov. 2011, 4.  
24
 Ibid., 6. 
25
 Ibid., 4 (emphasis in original). 
26
 Ibid. (emphasis in original). 
27
 See for a brief overview, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, “Rabat Process”, available at: 
www.icmpd.org/our-work/migration-dialogues/rabat-process/ (last visited 5 Oct. 2016) and for a brief comparison 
of the Khartoum Process and the Rabat Process, T. Reitano, The Khartoum Process: A sustainable response to 
human smuggling and trafficking? Institute for Security Studies, Policy Brief 93, Nov. 2016, 6-7. 
28
 COM(2011) 743, 8. 
29
 EU-Africa Declaration on Migration and Mobility, Fourth EU-Africa Summit, 2-3 Apr. 2014, 2. 
30
 Ibid., 2-3. 
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trafficking with the promotion of well-managed legal migration and mobility and the 
implementation of the Common European Asylum System.
31
  
It also expressed its intention to “promote the development of a migration dialogue with the 
Countries of East Africa.”32  
In October 2014, the AU, together with the Government of Sudan, UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
held a regional conference in Khartoum. Its stated aim was “to explore cooperation among the 
member states in the region in addressing the challenges of human trafficking and smuggling of 
migrants within and from the Horn of Africa, and to come up with a common approach in 
addressing this issue.”33 The conference provided a forum for States in the region, including, for 
the first time, Eritrea, to set out what steps they had taken in respect of human trafficking and 
smuggling, and for the AU to develop its policy and action plans in collaboration with key 
institutions working in the field of refugee protection and international migration. Several 
representatives of participating States resisted EU attempts to include a cross reference to the 
“EU Khartoum Process”, which was seen as usurping the AU process, in the AU Declaration 
adopted at the conference.
34
 
The EU-HoA Migration Route Initiative (the Khartoum Process) itself was launched in 
Rome on 28 November 2014. 37 States
35
 and the EU and AU Commissioners in charge of 
migration and development, as well as the EU High Representative/Vice President of the 
European Commission adopted the Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of the Khartoum 
Process (Rome Declaration). They agreed “to undertake concrete actions to prevent and tackle 
the challenges of human trafficking and smuggling of migrants between the Horn of Africa and 
Europe,”36 including  
                                                     
31
 Europe: a fresh start, Programme of the Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2014, 12 
(emphasis added). 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 AU, UNHCR, IOM, Government of Sudan, “AU Convene a Regional Conference to Address Human Trafficking 
and Smuggling in the Horn of Africa”, Joint Press Release, 13 Oct. 2014, 1. 
34
 Information shared with authors. See also critical comments by Reitano, The Khartoum Process, 4. 
35
 The 28 EU member States and Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tunisia. 
36
 “Rome Declaration”, 3. 
8 
 
 [tackling] irregular migration and criminal networks … improving national capacity 
building in the field of migration management … stepping up prevention measures … 
establishing national strategies to strengthen horizontal coordination among all services … 
identification and prosecution of criminal networks by enhancing national law enforcement 
agencies, and the judicial system responses … improving or, where appropriate, 
establishing criminal law frameworks … promoting a victim-centred approach … 
promoting sustainable development … developing a regional framework for return, 
including voluntary, and reintegration … [and] where appropriate, on a voluntary basis and 
upon individual request of a country in the region, assisting the participating countries in 
establishing and managing reception centres, providing access to asylum processes in line 
with international law, if needed, improving camp services and security, screening mixed 
migratory flows and counselling migrants.
37
 
The Khartoum Process is situated in the EU-Africa Action Plan on Migration and Mobility 
2014-2017,
38
 and forms part of the EU HoA Regional Plan 2015-2020.
39
 It “will be steered by a 
group of core EU and African countries
40
 as well as by the European Commission, the European 
External Action Service [EEAS], on the EU side, and the AU Commission.”41 Norway and 
Switzerland have become members of the Khartoum Process and several institutions have 
observer status.
42
 In parallel, States, such as the United Kingdom (UK)
 43
 have embarked on their 
own bilateral dialogues on migration, or, in the case of Italy, even signed problematic 
Memoranda of Understanding on migration with Sudan
44
 and other States, which form part of a 
broader EU policy on migration.
45
 A series of subsequent developments that intensified EU 
external engagement on migration in Africa have had a significant bearing on the Khartoum 
Process. In April 2015, the European Council expressed its commitment, as part of its objective 
                                                     
37
 Ibid., 3-4. 
38
 Ibid., 1. 
39
 Council Conclusions on the EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020, COAFR310 ACP 153 
CFSP/PESC 686 DEVGEN 205, 13363/15 (2015), 17, 26, 
40
 Italy, France, Germany, UK, Malta and Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan. 
41
 “Rome Declaration”, 5. 
42
 IOM, UNHCR, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 
43
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Completion of UK-Sudan strategic dialogue”, 20-21 March, 22 Mar. 2016. 
44
 “Sudan, Italy sign MoU to stem crime and irregular migration”, Sudan Tribune, 5 Aug. 2016 
45
 European Council, European Council Meeting Conclusions (25 and 26 June 2015) Conclusions, EUCO 22/15, CO 
EUR8 CONCL3, 26 Jun. 2015. 
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of “preventing illegal migration flows” to “reinforce our political cooperation with African 
partners at all levels in order to tackle the cause of illegal migration and combat the smuggling 
and trafficking of human beings.”46 One month later, the European Commission set out “A 
European Agenda on Migration”.47 The levels of action include “reducing the incentives for 
irregular migration,” in which “[p]artnership with countries of origin and transit is crucial,”48 
border management, a strong common asylum policy, and a new policy on legal migration.
49
 In 
November 2015, European and African Heads of State and Government adopted the EU Valletta 
Plan of Action at the Valletta summit. The Plan is  
 
designed to (1) address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; (2) 
enhance cooperation on legal migration and mobility; (3) reinforce the protection of 
migrants and asylum seekers; (4) prevent and fight irregular migration, migrant smuggling 
and trafficking in human beings; and (5) work more closely to improve cooperation on 
return, readmission and reintegration.
50  
According to the EU, “[t]he existing mechanisms of the Rabat Process, the Khartoum 
Process and the Joint EU-Africa strategy will be used to monitor the implementation of the 
action plan.”51 The Valletta Summit also led to the establishment of the Emergency Trust Fund 
for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa 
(EUTF). The Fund is a “multi-year facility designed to fund projects that promote resilience, 
stability and security in the Sahel, Horn and [North Africa] regions, in addition to other funds 
available.”52 €714 million of a total of €1.8 billion EUTF funds have been set aside for the HoA, 
to address root causes, improve conditions for refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 
host communities, and to strengthen migration management.
53
  
                                                     
46
 “Special meeting of the European Council, 23 Apr. 2015 – statement” (emphasis added). 
47
 COM(2015) 240 final. 
48
 Ibid., 7-8. 
49
 Ibid., 10-18. Subsequently, the Commission elaborated on “establishing a new partnership framework with third 
countries under the European Agenda on Migration”, which referred to “country packages for 16 priority countries”, 
including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan. COM(2016) 385 final, 7 Jun. 2016, 8. 
50
 See “2015 Valletta Summit on Migration Action Plan”, 11-12 Nov. 2015, 1. 
51
 See European Commission, “The EU Emergency Trust Fund Africa”, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa_en (last visited 5 Oct. 2016). 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Ibid.  
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The Action Plan: Better Migration Management in Support of the Khartoum Process (BMM) 
is the first major initiative. In December 2015, €40 million were drawn for the BMM, which falls 
under EUTF‟s third objective, “namely improved migration management in countries of origin 
and transit.”54 The BMM is to be implemented from April 2016 to March 2019 by several 
European and international organisations, including IOM and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), and is coordinated by the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ).
55
 The 
BMM embodies the twin focus on migration control and protection measures. It is expected to 
result in the development of national legislation in accordance with international standards, 
enhanced capacity “to manage migration effectively,” “improved access to justice and to 
protection facilities” for migrants and victims of trafficking, and “greater awareness of risk 
associated with irregular migration.”56 The Action Plan “will respond to needs identified by 
participants at the Khartoum Process first Steering Committee meeting.”57 Effectively, therefore, 
priorities are set through the Khartoum Process and the Trust Fund finances (substantial parts of) 
projects such as the BMM planned as part of the process.  
 
3.  THE KHARTOUM PROCESS AND A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED  
FRAMEWORK 
 
Article 21(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides that the EU‟s “action on the 
international scene shall be guided” by a set of principles, including the rule of law and human 
rights.
58
 This implies that the EU takes a human rights based approach when engaging in external 
action and partnerships, both substantively and in terms of a process guided by consultation, 
participation, transparency and accountability. 
59
 
                                                     
54
 EUTF, Action Fiche for the implementation of the Horn of Africa Window, T05-EUTF-HoA-REG-09: Better 
Migration Management (Khartoum Process) (undated). 
55
 The total amount for the BMM is €46 million, as Germany has provided a €6 million co-funding contribution. See 
COM(2016)385 final., and, for the project website, www.giz.de/en/worldwide/40602.html (last visited 4 Jul. 2017).  
56
 EUTF, Better Migration Management, 7-9. 
57
 Ibid., 2. 
58
 See Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (2016/C 202/01), C 202/28. 
59
 See on a human rights-based framework, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, UN 
Doc. A/71/285, 4 August 2016, para. 51. 
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The Rome Declaration “recall[s] that promotion and respect of human rights constitute a 
cross-cutting issue of our cooperation,” and includes references to rights and protection. It does 
not, however, specify how human rights are to be respected in the Khartoum Process. The latter 
has not been based on empirical research, and evaluation specific to the planned actions and the 
region to inform both policy making and the nature of measures taken.
60
 This concerns in 
particular the nature of migration, relevant human rights concerns in this regard, and practices 
relating to refugee protection, including an assessment of potentially adverse impacts of the 
planned actions.   
The Khartoum Process has been largely developed at the inter-State and inter-regional 
institutions level. There has been some, albeit limited, involvement of relevant international 
organisations but virtually no consultation or meaningful participation of concerned communities 
in the region, that is the right-holders and intended beneficiaries, and civil society 
representatives. In essence, it is a top-down process whose approach reflects the interests of 
European and HoA States, though not necessarily in equal measure,
61
 with limited evidence that 
its partners have taken “into account the consequences of their decisions on the lives and rights 
of migrants.”62 The combination of a high-level policy dialogue at ministerial and Commission 
level on the one hand and technical project implementation on the other has also resulted in a 
lack of representative political participation, and democratic scrutiny, in the development of the 
policy. This has been compounded by the limited transparency of the process, which has been 
part of a strategy to give the process as little publicity as possible so as to minimise the risk of 
adverse political consequences.
63
 Debates in the European Parliament
64
 and parliamentary 
                                                     
60
 See further, also on the lack of participation and transparency more broadly, M. Stern, The Khartoum Process: 
Critical Assessment and Policy Recommendations, Istituto Affari Internazionali, IAI Working Papers 15/49, Dec. 
2015, 12-13. 
61
 The process has not been without tensions with respect to divergent policy priorities (an EU focus on irregular 
migration in contrast to an AU focus on responsibility sharing and channels of legal migration), a lack of ownership 
(such as in respect of needs assessment and implementation of projects) and a failure to deliver pledged funding. See 
on “power asymmetries” of regional consultative processes, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Aug. 2013, para. 75. 
62
 Report of the Special Rapporteur, 2016, para. 51. 
63
 Stern, Khartoum Process, 11-12. An official website was launched in November 2016 more than two years after 
the Rome Declaration, see www.khartoumprocess.net (last visited 4 Jul. 2017).  
64
 See European Parliament, “Khartoum Process and the forthcoming „EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route 
Initiative‟ (debate)”, 17 Dec. 2014; European Parliament resolution of 6 Oct. 2016 on Sudan (2016/2911 (RSP)), 
paras. 16, 17. 
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questions in countries such as Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom
65
 highlight the 
demand for greater involvement of political representatives, transparency, and monitoring. They 
articulate the unease that the nature of the Khartoum Process has generated, particularly in 
respect of its adverse impact on the rights of migrants and refugee rights given the record of 
human rights violations of partner States. Statements by civil society organisations and 
individual commentators reflect similar concerns.
66
 The brief analysis of the process to date 
demonstrates that it has largely ignored even basic components of a human rights-based 
approach. There is no clear indication of how human rights have informed the process as “a 
cross-cutting issue” as stipulated in the Rome Declaration. This finding reinforces criticism of 
externalisation and informal governance partnerships as mechanisms that prioritise migration 
control over rights protection, rather than marrying pragmatism with principle.     
 
4.  SUBSTANTIVE FOCUS OF THE KHARTOUM PROCESS  
 
4.1. The nexus between human trafficking/smuggling and irregular migration 
The Khartoum Process, though forming part of broader EU-AU policies on migration, focuses, at 
least in its initial phase, firmly on trafficking and smuggling of vulnerable persons. The problem 
of, and extreme suffering caused by trafficking, and certain forms of smuggling in the region has 
been well documented.
67
  As rightly highlighted in the Rome Declaration, human trafficking is a 
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serious crime and human rights violation.
68
 Traffickers often threaten the well-being if not lives 
of refugees and migrants; while smugglers may equally do so, they also provide an essential, 
albeit illegal, service to those seeking to flee their countries.
69
 The framing of the Khartoum 
Process, particularly in terms of the nexus between irregular migration and smuggling/trafficking 
is problematic. Several authors have highlighted how the supposedly humanitarian concern to 
combat human trafficking and smuggling has been used to conceal the underlying purpose of 
(external) migration control,
70
 and how migration control as an overall EU migration policy fuels 
the very practices that are then subject to cooperative initiatives to combat the same.
71
 The UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, in his analysis of GAMM, 
 
… regret[ted] the linking of irregular migration with human trafficking, which may falsely 
give the impression that irregular migration is a criminal offence, in line with trafficking. 
While the smuggling of migrants may constitute a criminal offence, irregular migration 
does not, and should thus not be linked to security issues and crime.
72
 
The Rome Declaration expresses its deep concerns about “lives endangered by hazardous 
journeys across desert and sea.”73 Its authors stress that they are “more than ever committed to 
undertaking action to try to avoid such tragedies in full observance of human rights and human 
dignity.”74 However, there is no mention or acknowledgement that restrictive migration control 
and the limited scope of legal migration channels to the EU are critical factors contributing to 
this situation, and thereby call current EU policies into question. Instead, the thrust of the 
problems identified, and the areas of cooperation are all in the HoA region.  Mixed migration, 
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 See further P. Tinti and T. Reitano, Migrant, Refugee, Smuggler, Saviour, London, Hurst & Company, 2016. 
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From Refugee to Forced Migration Studies”, Journal of Refugee Studies, 22, 2009, 11-29. 
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and trafficking and smuggling of vulnerable persons, are portrayed as regional, African issues, 
rather than a joint, international problem. The key areas of cooperation identified in its text 
suggest that the main addressees are States in the region rather than the EU and its member 
States.
75
 Notwithstanding the commitment to better organised legal migration and managed 
human mobility between regions,
76
 the Declaration focuses on how initiatives within African 
member States can meet the joint commitments made therein. This includes ensuring “effective 
protection to refugees, asylum seekers, as well as to internally displaced persons, and to provide 
for due access to asylum processes in line with international law.”77 These features replicate a 
broader pattern of EU external action in which the newly created partners are made responsible 
for migration control measures.
78
 
The authors of the Rome Declaration “express our firm political commitment to expand 
the Khartoum Process into a sustainable regional dialogue on migration and mobility which will 
address the root causes of irregular migration and mixed migration flows in a comprehensive and 
balanced way,” which includes efforts to foster development and to provide channels for legal 
migration.
79
 This de facto relegation of key concerns for the HoA region to an unknown future 
date has made the Khartoum Process appear distinctively lopsided, a fact that has already met 
with criticism from African States.
80
  
 
4.2. Better Migration Management and its compatibility with rights protection 
An analysis of the main activities envisaged under the BMM as the first major project under the 
Khartoum Process demonstrates the challenges that its implementation poses to rights protection.   
The first activity concerns “capacity building support to relevant Khartoum Process 
countries, in particular Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan, in drafting national legislation 
and policies on migration and border management [particularly human trafficking].”81 This is an 
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important activity as most States in the region do not have adequate legal frameworks in place. 
Sudan responded to the lack of adequate legislation by adopting several laws in 2014 and 2015. 
The new Asylum Regulation Act of 2014 remedies some shortcomings of the 1974 Asylum 
Regulation Act but restricts freedom of movement and does not provide for adequate judicial 
guarantees to challenge deportation orders and revocation of refugee status.
82
 The 2014 
Combating of Human Trafficking Act (CHT Act)
83
 (there is no law on smuggling)
84
 has a broad 
definition of trafficking which is, however, not fully in line with the Palermo Protocol.
85
 It 
provides that the death penalty may be imposed for nine different aggravated acts of 
trafficking.
86
 Several of these acts do not meet the criteria of a “serious crime”, which is one of 
the prerequisites for the imposition of the death penalty in accordance with international law 
where still recognised as an exception to the right to life.
87
 Its Article 25 provides for the 
protection of victims and witnesses. However, the CHT Act is silent on the right of a foreign 
victim to remain in the country, at least temporarily, or a duty of the State to consider granting a 
temporary or permanent stay in its territory.
88
 It also does not provide for an unequivocal 
prohibition of refoulement.
89
  The United States Department of State, in its Trafficking in 
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Mar. 2014. A translated version of the Act is available at: 
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Cambridge University Press, 2010, 320-323. 
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Persons Report 2017,
90
 found a number of deficiencies in respect of prevention, prosecution, in 
particular impunity of officials, and protection,
91
 which reflects the findings of other observers 
on the measures taken by Sudan in respect of human trafficking.
92
 Under the BMM, Sudan has 
requested “[a]ssistance to develop or implement comprehensive migration policy, including 
human trafficking regulations,”93 which should, based on the foregoing analysis, also include 
reviewing any shortcomings of the CHT Act itself.  
The second BMM activity concerns “capacity-building support” in the form of “training, 
technical assistance and provision of relevant equipment, for judiciary and border management 
authorities to better address migration and border management.”94 This is arguably the most 
problematic project component. The building of capacity of law enforcement agencies, border 
forces and the judiciary presupposes the existence of a criminal justice system that is at least 
capable of functioning in accordance with the rule of law. This is an essential criterion as the 
Khartoum Process, and EU policy more broadly, stress the need for the protection of refugee 
rights and the human rights of migrants.
95
 Sudan has centralised law enforcement capacity but its 
criminal justice system is grossly deficient from a refugee rights and human rights perspective.  
Investigators in criminal cases, particularly those with a political dimension, have repeatedly 
resorted to arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and other ill-treatment
96
 and members of law 
enforcement agencies enjoy immunity for their conduct.
97
 Lack of access to justice, especially in 
the form of effective remedies in cases of human rights violations, is systemic, as recognised by 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (ACHPR) and other human rights treaty 
bodies.
98 
A number of crimes are subject to disproportionate punishments, including the death 
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penalty, which has been imposed and executed in violation of fair trial standards.
99
 Human 
trafficking is classified as a transnational crime (as in the case of terrorism offences) and tried by 
special courts under special rules and procedures which lack basic fair trial guarantees.
100
 
Conversely, there is no effective system of victim and witness protection or referral system.
101
 A 
member of the National Committee for Combating Human Trafficking acknowledged that the 
Committee does not have direct contact with victims of human trafficking, and that there are no 
safe houses for victims, ostensibly due to lack of international funding.
102
  
Sudan has repeatedly taken measures that are prima facie incompatible with its 
obligations under the Refugee Convention and other treaties. On several occasions, including 
after 2014,
103
 persons coming from neighbouring countries, particularly Eritrea, have been 
charged with unlawfully entering the country under the 1994 Passports and Immigration Act and, 
as from 2015, under the new Passports and Immigration Act, which provides for wide powers of 
deportation for illegal entry, without judicial review.
104
 This practice can also be attributed to 
confusion amongst law enforcement agencies as a result of multiple legal reforms, which are 
partly, as in the Passports and Immigration Act, in response to the Khartoum Process. The 2014 
CHT Act is not complemented by adequate anti-smuggling and migration laws, and refugees are 
often dealt with under the new Passports and Immigration Act, rather than the new Asylum 
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Regulation Act of 2014. In May 2016, for example, Sudanese authorities reportedly arrested and 
deported several hundred persons to Eritrea without giving them access to asylum status 
determination procedures.
105
 These measures risk constituting, or constitute a breach of Sudan‟s 
obligations not to refoule individuals at risk of persecution under the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and the African Protocol of 1969 on Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, and/or serious 
human rights violations, and therefore the principles agreed upon in the Khartoum Process.
106
 
The envisaged provision of training and equipment to Sudanese law enforcement and 
security agencies is highly problematic.
107
 The BMM Action Fiche acknowledges the risk that: 
“Provision of equipment and trainings to sensitive national authorities (such as security services 
or border management) diverted for repressive aims.”108 This is a genuine risk in respect of 
agencies that have, and a regime which has, according to a number of well documented fact-
finding missions, cases and other sources, been responsible for serious human rights 
violations.
109
 A number of accounts of trafficked persons, particularly Eritreans, describe how 
Sudanese border guards have colluded with traffickers.
110
 These forms of complicity in criminal 
activities are part of a broader practice of corrupt and illicit conduct in which members of the 
National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) and others are alleged to be involved.
111
 The 
known risk of abuse that the provision of training and equipment carries may, were it to 
materialise, expose the EU and its member states to allegations of complicity, and possibly 
litigation.
112
 The mitigating measures considered in the BMM, such as “senior level buy-in” and 
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“reliance on well-experienced implementing partner with good political relations with the target 
countries” evince a political and instrumentalist mindset.113 This technical approach does not 
specify how it can ensure, or even minimise the risk that equipment and training is not used for 
repressive aims, particularly in a situation where a convergence of objectives (EU migration 
control measures and Sudanese access to valuable equipment) may result in a mutual interest to 
ignore any misuse. It also shows a lack of historical awareness of the multiple failures by 
countries such as Sudan to honour their international commitments.
114 
  
The other risks identified in EUTF‟s assessment suffer from similar shortcomings. They 
primarily focus on operational challenges in terms of project management (lack of follow up and 
political will, lack of incentives to renounce and fight corruption, inadequate resources)
115
 and 
ignore the fundamental challenge that cooperation with a repressive regime in the highly 
sensitive area of migration control and criminal justice may facilitate abuses, instead of 
preventing them. Indeed, the project may even incentivise a partner State to violate the rights of 
refugees and migrants in order to demonstrate its capacity to control migration. The proposed 
strengthening of the border in Sudan, while in principle a legitimate aim, is against this 
background risking greater exposure of smuggled or trafficked persons to Sudanese border 
guards who may abuse their powers (collusion in trafficking, extortion) or violate refugees‟ 
rights (refoulement at the border, or, following entry, arbitrary arrest and detention and eventual 
deportation without due process of law). The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
116
 have 
reportedly already been deployed to combat human trafficking and arrested several hundred 
“illegal immigrants”117 close to Sudan‟s northern borders (Libya, Egypt) and Sudanese 
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authorities arrested and deported hundreds of Eritreans in May 2016.
118
 The European 
Parliament raised concerns about reports that the RSF had been deployed to patrol Sudan‟s 
border with Egypt and Libya in August 2016 and  
 
call[ed] on the EEAS and the Commission to closely monitor EU development assistance 
in Sudan in order to prevent any direct or indirect support to local militias, and to ensure 
that RSF forces patrolling Sudan‟s borders with Egypt and Libya do not purport to fight 
illegal migration on behalf of the EU.
119
 
Sudan proposed the building of two reception centres in Gadaref and Kassala in eastern Sudan, 
with custody rooms, which EUTF commented upon as “in principle could be funded later”.120 
This measure would enhance the risk of arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as ill-treatment of 
refugees and migrants, considering that these practices are systemic in Sudan and that those 
detained in these centres would be particularly vulnerable with no effective access to justice. The 
prospect of funding such centres has for these reasons attracted widespread criticism.
121
 The 
building of such centres has now been ruled out.
122
 
The third BMM action concerns “assistance to victims of trafficking and vulnerable 
smuggled migrants to ensure access to appropriate services, including access to justice.”123  This 
is clearly important and projects such as those proposed by Sudan may have some positive 
impact: “Improved migration management capacity and services (friendly entry and exit 
processing and assistance for victims and vulnerable people).”124 However, systemic concerns 
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about Sudan‟s laws and institutions apply equally to a system that lacks legislation, facilities, 
experts and an institutional culture in the field of victim and witness protection, as well as 
effective access to justice. Sudanese authorities reported a number of operations and arrests of 
suspected smugglers and traffickers, as well as the “release of hundreds of victims”.125 Yet, 
reports noting the lack of adequate protection accorded to trafficking victims in Sudan suggest 
that the risk identified in the BMM that “victims of smugglers and traffickers continue being 
criminalised for irregular immigration, prostitution, petty crimes and not treated as victims”126 is 
genuine and reflective of actual practice. According to the US Trafficking in Persons Report 
2016:  
Although the government reported law enforcement efforts against trafficking offenders, 
officials frequently conflated trafficking with other crimes, such as smuggling and 
kidnapping, and convicted offenders received severely weak sentences that were 
insufficient to deter the crime. ... The government identified a significant number of 
victims of abuse, including some trafficking victims, during security operations; however, 
the government failed to identify victims of sex trafficking or forced labor. Authorities 
continued to punish trafficking victims for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of 
being subjected to trafficking, such as immigration violations. The government lacked 
capacity and resources to provide adequate protective services to all forms of trafficking.
127
 
The fourth BMM action consists of the “launch of information campaigns and community 
conversations, targeting communities of origin and transit of migrants, on risk of irregular 
migration, including trafficking in human beings and alternatives to irregular migration.”128 Its 
apparent thrust is dissuasion of would-be, “irregular” migrants. Notably, there is no reference to 
any information on legal migration or the rights of migrants and refugees. The main assumption 
for the success of this component is that the “target population has access to radio and other 
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media and is able to read written information sheets.”129 Sudan has proposed “[a]wareness 
raising and promotion of legal migration (government institutions, civil society and the 
media).”130 This action is based on the premise that the government concerned is a trustworthy 
and effective communicator, which only needs access to appropriate media to convey relevant 
messages to a receptive audience. The BMM has now adopted an approach that primarily relies 
on civil society organisations as partners.
131
 Ultimately, information campaigns and community 
conversations are unlikely to succeed as long as the root causes of migration, including poverty, 
underdevelopment and human rights violations, persist, which prompt individuals to take risks 
by means of using irregular migration routes.   
The foregoing scrutiny of the BMM demonstrates the inadequacy of a project 
management approach, that is a technical approach to a political and economic crisis, as a mode 
of governance to achieve broader policy objectives. This approach is based on the assumption of 
cooperation by reliable partners who are capable of satisfactorily implementing projects in the 
legally complex and highly challenging areas of migration law and criminal justice, which 
ignores the systemic rule of law failings of national systems. Engagement “with repressive 
governments on migration (particularly in Eritrea and Sudan)” does not only carry the 
reputational risk identified by EUTF.
132
 It also raises fundamental concerns about the ability of 
such governments to implement specific projects in the absence of more far-reaching, mid- to 
long-term legal, institutional and political reforms. A partnership model driven by migration 
control imperatives based on Western models of refugee protection further risks transforming 
traditional modes of receiving refugees, such as replacing group recognition with restrictive 
individual screening in Sudan. This is complemented by concerns of officials working in the 
field of migration and refugee law that the politicised top-down approach will result in 
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militarisation of the border and a preference for taking measures that are incompatible with a 
rights-based approach.
133
   
The project management model and mitigating measures conceived in political and 
technical terms are patently inadequate to ensure an adequate level of rights protection in the 
absence of what must be considered basic human rights safeguards and monitoring procedures. 
There are no benchmarks and narrow quantitative indicators only.
134
 The monitoring of 
implementation appears to be guided by a project-based rather than a human rights-based 
approach.
135
 The ignorance of structural factors impacting implementation and the lack of robust 
monitoring and review therefore make it highly unlikely that the expected results can be 
achieved in conformity with respect for applicable rights within the limited parameters of the 
programme.  
 
5.  COHERENCE OF EU EXTERNAL ACTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROTECTION  
 
Article 21(1) of the TEU stipulates that: 
 
The Union‟s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principle which have 
inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in 
the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international 
law.  
The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and 
international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the 
first subparagraph. 
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Most HoA States participating in the Khartoum Process have a poor record in respect of 
human rights protection. As recognised by EUTF, this applies particularly to Eritrea and 
Sudan.
136
 The UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea found that “systematic, 
widespread and gross human rights violations have been and are being committed in Eritrea 
under the authority of the Government.”137 As a consequence, “hundreds of thousands of 
Eritreans are fleeing the country… Eritreans are fleeing severe human rights violations in their 
country and are in need of protection.”138 On the administration of justice, the Commission noted 
pithily: “It is not law that rules Eritreans, but fear.”139 Similarly, a large number of UN reports, 
decisions by the ACHPR and civil society reports, have documented Sudan‟s responsibility for 
gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law in the course of armed conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile.
140
 
Several high-ranking officials, including Sudan‟s President Omar al-Bashir, are subject to 
International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants for international crimes.
141
 As various bodies 
have expressed concerns about the lack of respect for the rule of law and human rights in both 
Eritrea and Sudan, the two States in particular
142
 cannot be credibly characterised as countries 
that share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph of article 21(1) TEU.  
Article 21(2)(a) TEU sets out as the objective of EU cooperation in international relations 
the safeguarding of the EU‟s “values, fundamental interests, security, independence and 
integrity”. Migration control has a bearing on several of these objectives. However, article 21(2) 
(b) also underscores the objective of “consolidate[ing] and support[ing] democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and the principles of international law.” Article 21(3) exhorts the EU to 
“respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2” in its external 
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action, and to “ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between 
these and its other policies.” 
There is a clear tension between the Khartoum Process and the EU‟s human rights 
policy,
143
 which threatens coherence
144
 and consistency of action between the areas of migration 
and human rights protection. Co-operating with States such as Eritrea and Sudan on issues of 
migration entails the risk that the EU and its member States are less willing to insist on human 
rights protection and on holding co-operating States and responsible individuals to account.  For 
the Khartoum Process to be successful, participating States must be treated and perceived as 
legitimate partners.
145
 These States are aware of the EU‟s interest in making the Khartoum 
Process work, and may use this to gain concessions. Sudan has already done so by calling for 
support for the lifting of sanctions, debt relief and its removal from the list of States sponsoring 
terrorism in return for its cooperation in migration control measures.
146
 It may also threaten non-
cooperation in response to any criticism over its human rights record. The approach taken in the 
Khartoum Process is part of broader, at times contradictory international engagement vis-à-vis 
Sudan, over the last decade, and recent rapprochement that increasingly treats Sudan as a reliable 
actor if not partner in the region, and downplays human rights concerns.
147
 It is difficult to see 
how this approach can be reconciled with the Council of the EU‟s “Strategic Framework for the 
Horn of Africa” objective of supporting “the people of the region in achieving peace, stability, 
security, prosperity and accountable government.”148 The recently adopted EU HoA Regional 
Action Plan identifies both migration and “[v]iolations of human rights, absence of the rule of 
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law and authoritarian governance”149 as challenges but is silent on how to address the inevitable 
tensions between policy approaches in this regard.  
The Khartoum Process risks failing to meet the EU‟s obligation (“shall”) to “ensure 
consistency and coherence between its instruments and policies in all areas of its external and 
internal action in relation to the most serious international crimes as referred to in the Rome 
Statute.”150 In the implementation of the Khartoum Process, the EU does not directly interact 
with individuals subject to an arrest warrant by the ICC. However, it engages with 
representatives of, and, at least indirectly, relies on forces, such as the NISS and RSF who are 
alleged to have been responsible for crimes falling within the ICC‟s remit.151  
The approach taken in the Khartoum Process also raises questions about the coherence of 
the EU‟s, particularly the European Commission‟s, external action in the field of migration. This 
concerns the need to address all areas of the EU‟s policy of better migration management, 
including EU policy on channels of legal migration.
152
 It comprises rights protection, as “[t]he 
impact on fundamental rights of initiatives taken in the context of the GAMM must be 
thoroughly assessed.”153 Further, “[t]he GAMM should strengthen respect for fundamental rights 
and the human rights of migrants in source, transit and destination countries alike.”154 There is 
no indication how this objective can be achieved without far-reaching reforms in countries such 
as Eritrea and Sudan whose systematic and systemic human rights violations result in forced 
displacement and whose authorities have repeatedly violated the rights of citizens and foreign 
nationals (in the migration context) alike.  Instead, the approach taken validates, rather than 
heeds, François Crépeau‟s critique of migration management programmes that  
 [i]t appears much more „efficient‟ to do capacity building in transit States so that their 
authorities will carry out the arrest, detention, and deportation of irregular migrants, and 
refugee determination procedures if need be. Most of those countries do not have the same 
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democratic culture, the same human rights protection infrastructure, the same active and 
vocal civil society organisations caring for migrants, the same investigative journalism, or 
the same independent and competent judiciary. From a Global North perspective, these 
deficiencies are actually considered an asset in „migration management‟ because they do 
not hamper the swift deportation of migrants.
155
 
6.  PARAMETERS OF AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
 
The Khartoum Process in its present form is untenable from a rights perspective. The Process has 
lacked transparency, and participation and awareness of key actors. It overly focuses on 
repressive measures to the detriment of broader prevention and responsibility sharing strategies 
in the area of migration. Its project management approach to fighting human trafficking and 
smuggling is overly technical, failing to take due account of how EU external migration control 
policies, the responsibility of partner States for forced migration, and structural rule of law 
shortcomings adversely impact the successful implementation of planned actions. This is 
compounded by the lack of clear human rights benchmarks, monitoring and oversight of project 
implementation. As a result, the Khartoum Process, solemn declarations to the contrary 
notwithstanding, lacks sufficient guarantees to uphold the rights of refugees and the human rights 
of migrants. Its effectiveness to prevent trafficking and smuggling and help victims rests on 
questionable assumptions, and there are already indications that it may have contributed to rights 
violations. On a broader policy level, the EU and its member States have taken insufficient 
account of how the Khartoum Process relates to, and negatively impacts, other EU policies, 
particularly in the field of human rights protection. An end to any cooperation with States in the 
region would leave the pressing issue of trafficking of vulnerable persons unresolved, and would 
have considerable political costs.  Against this background, the section will sketch out the 
parameters of a changed approach that is rights compliant, and ensures the greatest possible 
coherence between various EU policies in the field of external relations. To begin with, the 
reference to context and root causes in various EU documents on the HoA is overly general, and 
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devoid of any sense of agency.
156
 It obscures the fact that States‟ policies in the region have 
contributed to, if not caused the production of refugee flows, and how overly restrictive EU entry 
policies, in particular the absence of legal migration routes, have played a part in fuelling 
smuggling and human trafficking. The Khartoum Process therefore addresses symptoms but fails 
to acknowledge, and tackle key underlying causes. This assessment calls for a more holistic 
engagement that links an improvement in the human rights and governance situation in the States 
concerned and changes to the EU external migration policy, by opening channels of legal 
migration and easing access more generally.
157
 The Commission of Inquiry on human rights in 
Eritrea has made the link between human rights violations and forced migration explicit, calling 
on the international community “[i]n engaging with the Eritrean authorities on solutions to stem 
the flow of asylum seekers from Eritrea, place human rights considerations at the forefront of 
any package of proposed abatement measures”158 and  “[k]eep Eritrea under close scrutiny until 
tangible progress in the situation of human rights is evident, and ensure the centrality of human 
rights in all engagement with the country.”159  
Initiatives such as the Khartoum Process should therefore be based on a broader approach 
that treats migration as one element of a wider political dialogue that addresses the human rights 
concerns that lie at the root of most migration in, and from the region.
160
 The current, 
instrumental and state-centric approach is overly reliant on law enforcement institutions with 
limited capacity and poor governance and human rights records. Legislative and institutional 
reforms in this regard need to move beyond the narrow confines of migration related measures in 
order to guarantee a sound administration of justice in implementing the process.
161
 While a 
repressive approach to human trafficking and smuggling is mandated by international law, there 
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is an equal duty, and considerable scope for preventive approaches.
162
 This includes a focus on 
the drivers of forced migration and vulnerability in the region, which calls for an evidence-led 
approach that is based on the participation, and needs of affected communities, civil society 
representatives and other actors working in the field. There is also scope to listen more carefully 
to a range of African actors, and how they conceive of the problems they face and ways to tackle 
them. This includes opening channels for legal migration within the region and in Europe, 
supporting refugees in host countries, and engaging in broader development initiatives, without, 
however, making development assistance conditional on migration control, or treating 
development as a containment device.
163
  EUTF is already funding some projects to this end,
164
 
notably including a “special support measure in favour of the people of the Republic of Sudan” 
that focuses on support to basic services, livelihoods and food security and to civil society, local 
governance and peace-building.
165
 While important, these measures are likely to remain 
piecemeal and insufficient to address the broader challenges outlined above unless migration is 
viewed as a genuinely joint responsibility and linked to broader human rights concerns. 
Respect for refugee rights and human rights is referenced in several EU documents.
166
 This is 
important but needs to be complemented by adequate mechanisms in order to ensure that such 
respect becomes integral to any actions under the Khartoum Process. Transparency at all levels, 
i.e. EU, AU, national States, and all stages of the process is vital to ensure scrutiny and address 
any concerns at the earliest possible stage. This transparency can be fostered by broader 
participation in policy-making of a cross-section of actors in the field, including UNHCR and the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, and consultation of civil society 
representatives, particularly from the HoA itself. The mode of implementation needs to move 
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from a project management approach that largely relies on project based evaluation to a human 
rights model that sets out clear benchmarks, monitoring procedures by independent entities or 
observers, and sanctions in case of violations of refugee rights or human rights of migrants. 
Monitoring is to encompass all aspects of project implementation, including adequate use of any 
equipment and funds received or used by partner States. 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
The Khartoum Process is part of multiple EU policy responses to the complex challenges of 
large-scale mixed migration and organised transnational crime. The EU has a legitimate interest 
to take action that seeks to address these challenges. The Khartoum Process, however, represents 
a model that is flawed on many counts. It forms part of informal, ad-hoc policy responses to the 
“refugee crisis”,167 primarily by further externalising migration control, which undermine efforts 
to develop a coherent framework for global migration governance.
168
 The review of the 
underlying assumptions and logic of implementation confirms the validity of studies critical of 
such informal modes of governance and their inadequate design and focus from the perspective 
of a human rights-based framework.   
The HoA faces a crisis. Mixed migration, including human smuggling and trafficking, is 
amongst its many symptoms. The root causes are deep-seated and require fundamental reforms 
that help establish peaceful and stable States. Any external action in the field of migration in a 
region such as the HoA constitutes a serious political, legal and practical challenge for the EU 
and concerned States. The findings of our analysis suggest that the EU and other policy makers 
have paid insufficient attention to these challenges, ignoring the considerable body of literature, 
and the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, who have repeatedly raised 
concerns about the nature of regional initiatives and partnerships and their adverse impact on 
rights protection. Partnering with States responsible for repression and conflict is particularly, 
and inherently, problematic. Firmly establishing human rights protection as an overriding 
objective that reaches beyond the scope of any issue-specific engagement is an imperative 
foundation for any engagement in such a context. This finding is not only relevant in the specific 
                                                     
167
 See on this point, C. Dauvergne, “Refugee law as perpetual crisis”, in S.S. Juss and C. Harvey (eds.), 
Contemporary Issues in Refugee Law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013, 13-30.  
168
 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Aug. 2013, paras. 69-76. 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Refugee Survey Quarterly published by Oxford University Press: 
https://academic.oup.com/rsq/issue  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24508/  
 
 
 
context of the HoA but should inform policy making at the international level, particularly in the 
debates on the Global Compact for Migration, and at the regional level in the pursuit of EU 
external action on migration. Considering the future of the Khartoum Process, cooperation must 
not entail an expectation that the EU and its member States will compromise on human rights 
protection. An important means to ensure this is to effectively engage civil society and 
communities, particularly in the affected regions, and relevant national, regional and sub-
regional institutions in the policy formulation and implementation of projects under the 
Khartoum Process and related activities on migration in the HoA. The failure to engage local 
actors beyond State representatives risks conveying the message, all too familiar in the region, 
that political projects serve the interests of elites who ignore the legitimate expectations, and 
suffering of those they rule (and are supposed to represent). It also carries echoes of colonial 
powers using local chiefs to tame the restless “natives”.169 Fundamental changes to the Khartoum 
Process, and the EU‟s policy on migration more broadly, are therefore overdue if the EU wants 
to take seriously its self-proclaimed image as guardian of democracy, peace, human rights and 
the rule of law, both at home and abroad. 
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